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To simultaneously address social equity and spatial equity, we develop a new type of preference modelling to
distribute infrastructure resources that takes into account neighbourhood inequity effects. We compare this so-called
spatial preference modelling (SPM) with the more common non-spatial preference modelling (NSPM) in terms of their
compliance to two distinct perspectives of welfare theory, i.e., utilitarian and non-utilitarian welfare theory. With respect
to utilitarian theory, we apply a total utility equality approach, whereas for non-utilitarian equality, we conduct a curve
dominance analysis to evaluate the effect on (1) pro-poor policy, (2) inequity and (3) prosperity. A case study for the
Special Region of Yogyakarta in Indonesia is used to show the difference in the effectiveness of SPM and NSPM in
resolving resource allocation problems in the fields of transportation, electricity, telecommunication and freshwater
infrastructures, four fields of infrastructure that differ in terms of their typology (point, linear, plane and space), initial
level of development and spatial inequity. The results confirm that SPM complies better with both welfare theories
than NSPM. Moreover, the curve dominance analysis reveals that infrastructure characteristics and the level of
development contribute to model effectiveness. Hence, the findings can contribute to a more effective policy for
equitable growth.
Keywords: Preference modelling; SDSS; Social equity; Spatial equity; Utilitarian; Non-utilitarian; Infrastructure
planning; IndonesiaBackground
A long-term inequitable distribution of resources in
a country often results in all various social issues
(e.g., crimes and social tension). Indonesia has also
been challenged by both social and spatial inequality
issues. Since 1997–1998, when massive riots demanding
political reform led President Suharto to step down, these
issues have been driving continuous governance reforms
to be more decentralized and aimed at equitable welfare
among regions and social groups.
Infrastructure service is one of the instruments for dis-
tributing welfare and addressing social and spatial equity
(equality of opportunity). Many countries, including
Indonesia, have the option to deliver infrastructure
service through either a state monopoly or a market-
driven pro-competitive mechanism. Meanwhile, the* Correspondence: arif.wismadi@ugm.ac.id
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the Creative Commons license, and indicate ifglobal liberalization trend has shifted some public ser-
vice provision into a more market-driven orientation,
allowing private industry to compete.
Among the four infrastructure sectors discussed here,
in Indonesia, the provision and management of trans-
portation infrastructure is still led by the government,
but the landscape of mobility is determined by private
companies and vehicle industries. The electricity sector
has been introducing private investment opportunities
for energy production, but the monopoly of state-owned
enterprises for energy distribution is maintained. Water
infrastructure is provided through local government
enterprises, but they are operating in a competitive en-
vironment with global bottled drinking water industries.
Telecommunication has been reformed from a state
monopoly into a full liberal market for mobile services.
In this case, no single infrastructure asset is owned by
government, and development is driven by market-
oriented private investment.
The market-driven approach has been shown to be
efficient (Zhang 2014), and it has resulted in moree is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
rg/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
e appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
changes were made.
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infrastructure roll-out tends to go to places where wealthy
people or markets are concentrated (Sovacool 2013), thus
leaving some areas and social groups unserved or under-
served (Sager 2011). Meanwhile, state-owned enterprises,
with their mandate for distributing equitable service among
people and locations, including non-commercially feasible
and remote areas, face difficulties setting cross-subsidy tar-
iffs in a market-driven environment to allow for rural
investment.
In such a case, market-driven policy has increased the
problem of unequal service provision (Araral 2009) across
people and spaces. Therefore, the government has reviewed
the market-driven approach and applied measures to
ensure a more equitable development. Such policies, that
are implemented as so-called public service obligation
(PSO) programs, e.g., for transportation, or universal ser-
vice obligation (USO) programs, in the telecommunications
and electricity sectors (i.e., the rural electrification pro-
gram), have been strengthened with the introduction of the
National Act No 25/2009 on Public Service to ensure equit-
able service among social groups and regions. These policy
measures are managed by the government with funding
support from industry and the state budget.
The attempt to reach an equitable welfare distribution
through sector reforms and decentralized actions has
been in place for almost two decades. However, inequity
has continued to increase, as indicated by a rise in the
Gini Index of income distribution from 0.335 to 0.413
between 1996 and 2013 (BPS 2014). This indicates that
the implemented policies, being either “people centred”
(as in market driven) or “place based” (addressing re-
gional disparity) did not sufficiently address equitable
growth. Decades of continuous inequity have also re-
vealed the absence of proper information and decision
mechanisms to allocate resources to target groups or lo-
cations. Such mechanisms are critical to support a re-
source distribution under a constrained budget, progress
monitoring, and more importantly are a means to for-
mulate effective policy for prioritizing allocation.
The knowledge of addressing equity issues in decision-
making requires a theory of social choice and an applic-
able method of preference modelling that simultaneously
addresses equitable social and spatial distributions. In de-
cision support systems (DSS), such preference modelling
(PM) refers to a routine that aims to model stakeholder
preferences into priority making for selecting certain op-
tions, or to locate the allocation of resources (Tsoukias
1991; Perny and Roy 1992; Benferhat et al. 2006; Piccolo
and D’Elia 2008; Roberts and Tsoukiás 2009).
To address inequity issues, discussions on the concept
of fairness in the distribution of resources and welfare
have been going on for decades (Smith 1977; Sen 1980;
Dworkin 1981a, b; Nussbaum 2003; Sen 2004; Sudgen2006; Qizilbash 2011). For example, David Marshall
Smith and Amartya Sen started the debate in which they
questioned the moral philosophy of fairness behind the
equality of distribution already in the late 1970s.
Whereas Smith (1977) questioned the lack of moral
concern in the geographical distribution of welfare, Sen
(1980) argued that the established concept of equality,
which is based on utilitarian theory, has limitations in se-
curing fairness. The most serious limitation, he argued, is
the non-compliance to pro-poor policy, particularly if the
planner employs equality of marginal utility. This measure
attempts to equalize the satisfaction (marginal utility)
between the rich and the poor for each unit of additional
resources. Naturally, the rich demand more than the poor,
and as an implication, more resource goes to the rich.
The alternative measure in utilitarian theory is that of
equality of total utility, where the planner aims to
maximize the total utility of resource distribution
(Maniquet 2004). In such a case, as the poor are more
easily satisfied; priority is given to the poor to maximize
the total utility.
Sen (1980) also introduced an alternative measure for
a non-utilitarian model. He introduced a capability ap-
proach that aims to measure additional capability,
instead of satisfaction, due to a distributed resource.
Hence, a non-utilitarian would focus more on increased
capability through the provision of equality of oppor-
tunity (Maniquet 2004).
Those approaches have provided a good basis for
measuring equality among social groups, but less atten-
tion has been given to aspects of spatial inequity, i.e., to
the measurement of equality between areas or regions.
Most inequality measurements (Eliazar and Sokolov
2012), social welfare functions (Dolan and Tsuchiya
2009) and preference modelling (Domshlak et al. 2011)
address only social equality, whereas spatial inequality
can contribute to large problems for society, e.g., con-
centrations of crime (Wang and Arnold 2008) or in-
creased health risks (Chandola 2012). Some previous
works have tried to include such spatial features in re-
source allocation (Cloke et al. 2001; Chakhar and
Mousseau 2007; Bissonnette et al. 2012). However,
these methods again do not look at social equity issues.
Hence, using only one of these approaches, decisions
may overlook the social or spatial dimension of the in-
equity problem.
To simultaneously address social and spatial equity,
Wismadi et al. (2013) proposed a new type of preference
modelling to allocate resources by explicitly taking
neighbourhood inequity into account. Here, this spatial
preference modelling (SPM) addresses equity not only
among people but also across locations. In accordance
with this concept, priority will be given to addressing the
inequity of two persons at a closer distance than two
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ther apart. This model has been shown to be able to
effectively address spatial equality in the case of
transportation infrastructure. However, the compliance
of the result to a more general moral philosophy of
fairness, i.e., following Sen (1980), still needs to be
investigated.
The purpose of this study is therefore to compare spatial
preference modelling (SPM) with the more common non-
spatial preference modelling (NSPM) for resource alloca-
tion in terms of its compliance to two distinct theories of
welfare (i.e., utilitarian vs non-utilitarian welfare) and evalu-
ate its practical implication to improve the effectiveness of
resource allocation policy for infrastructure development.
The next section explains the methods for resource al-
location and equity measurement. The third section re-
ports the results of the simulation, and the fourth
section discusses the important findings of this study
and discusses the implications for policy implementa-
tion. The last section concludes.
Methods
We compare the compliance of SPM and NSPM to the
principle of equity, as proposed in both utilitarian andTable 1 The data set





























































*Code refers to village level database of Village Potency (PODES) in Statistical Bureanon-utilitarian theories. To learn their practical implica-
tions, both preference modelling approaches are ap-
plied to resource allocation for four different types of
infrastructure (i.e., roads, electricity, telecommunica-
tions and water). As shown in Table 1, each of them
has a different network typology; i.e., roads: linear; elec-
tricity: linear; telecommunications: a combination of
linear (fibre optic and copper fixed lines) and space
(mobile networks); and water: a combination of linear
(freshwater pipe) and space (ground water sources) all
have different typologies. The simulation is developed
for scenario-based rather than optimisation-based ap-
plications. Hence, a ‘what if ’ type of question relating
to policy objectives, is more appropriate rather than to
provide the model user with the ‘best’ option under
given criteria. However, to demonstrate how the algo-
rithm is capable to perform iteration mechanisms to-
ward an optimisation-based applications, a two-step
iteration is also demonstrated and observed in this re-
search. Hence, two what-if scenarios of simulation are
performed, first by assigning one target growth applied
in one simulation, then secondly, by assigning half of




The system is formed by a linear type of
infrastructure. Mobility relies on private vehicle with
limited public transport in urban areas. Low
performance indicates traffic jam (urban) and a
poor state of infrastructure (rural).
d average of
y supply for poor
-poor.
The system is formed by a linear type of
infrastructure. The network is laid along the road
network. High performance indicates urban and
more developed villages.
d average of data
capacity of fixed
mobile networks.
The system is formed by a combination of linear and
space types of infrastructure. The networks of linear
systems rely on fiber optic (urban center) and copper
(urban to sub-urban) along the road networks. The
wireless mobile networks extend a space type of net-
work to reach market in rural area..
scharge capacity
each type of
The system is formed by a combination of point,
linear and space types of infrastructure. Urban area
served by linear public fresh water with option to
private wells as the water source. Underground
water forms space type of infrastructures. Point
infrastructures are found in dry areas lacking water
sources (white cluster in Fig. 1).
pulation 401a + Population is distributed in flat areas which are
historically fertile or recently served with
infrastructure, especially road networks and
economically more developed areas.
u of Statistics (BPS), Indonesia
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aims to distribute a target growth of infrastructure ser-
vice performance for each location rather than directly
determine the amount of distributed resources, such as
monetary units or construction materials. Resource allo-
cation in this study refers to a percentage of the target
growth of performance, which later could be achieved
with increasing investment or operational expenditure to
reach the targeted performance in the respected loca-
tion. Here, we do not calculate the actual amount of re-
sources that need to be allocated.
The spatial unit in this study is a village, the lowest ad-
ministration unit, below a province or a district, for
which we set a target of an additional level of service.
The target in this experiment is a 10 % growth from the
current level of infrastructure performance. With the
objective of addressing inequity, some villages receive
more priority and an increased service level higher than
10 %, whereas others might receive less than 10 %
growth compared to the initial service level.
This allocation can be illustrated by looking at national
level development policies, where a government—or pol-
iticians during election periods—often declare a target
economic growth of, for example, 10 %. This 10 %
growth is often cited as the “2-digit” optimistic target of
national development (Yuan et al. 2008; Chen 2010;
Ohana 2010). This aggregate target of 10 % at a national
or district level must somehow be implemented in lower
administrative units. This target growth distribution
should not simply be applied with 10 % growth of each
village because the poorest village would receive an ab-
solute value that is lower than the 10 % growth of the
richest. If more resources are allocated to the rich than
to the poor, the allocation would not comply with a
sense of fairness.
Spatial preference modelling (both SPM and NSPM)
has been formulated to give priority to the poor, and it
aims to reduce the inequality amongst them. By introdu-
cing spatial proximity as the preference factor in SPM,
the spatial patterns of the location of allocated resources
will be distinct from NSPM. In SPM, more priority is
given to addressing the inequality of two villages at a
closer distance than two others at the same levels of in-
equality but located at a further distance. By contrast, in
NSPM, the priority for growth will consider only the in-
equality level amongst villages and disregard the distance
between the compared villages. The variations in the tar-
get growth distribution from the two models are the
basis for comparing SPM and NSPM with respect to the
effectiveness of achieving the objectives of utilitarian and
non-utilitarian approaches.
The framework of this research is outlined into the
three common stages of decision-making processes
(Simon 1960), i.e., the intelligence (specify decisionproblems and objectives), design (generate an alternative
solution) and choice stages (evaluate and recommend the
solution), as summarized in Fig. 1.
Study area and data
Indonesia is a vast archipelago that comprises over 17,000
islands form a land mass of 1,919,440 km2 populated by
253 million inhabitants (Rowley and Abdul-Rahman 2008).
To move towards equitable growth, in addition to fo-
cusing on the main national infrastructure networks,
various village-level programs are also implemented,
e.g., a rural electrification programme (Outhred and
Retnanestri 2015; started in the 1970s with more than
USD 200 million annually) and a rural telecommunica-
tions USO program (since 2010 in more than 35,000
villages with approximately USD 500 million annually,
which has been expanded with a Presidential Decree
96/2014 as the Indonesia Broadband Plan). In other
sectors, such as roads and water supply, there are
community-based infrastructure programmes, i.e., the
Kecamatan Development Programme (KDP), which are
financed by the World Bank (USD 1.2 billion), which
began in 1998 and were aimed at 28,000 villages (Das
2015). Kecamatan is a sub-district administration level
in Indonesia. There are more than 4,000 sub-districts in
the country. On average, a sub-district contains 20 vil-
lages and has a population of over 50,000 people.
Our study area, the Special Province of Yogyakarta,
Indonesia (Fig. 2), is one of the targets of those
programmes. Populated with approximately 3.4 million
people, it consists of 438 villages, with an average of 5,632
inhabitants each. The average size of a village is 724.43 ha
with a minimum of 26.57 ha in urban areas and a max-
imum of 2,890.36 ha in more rural areas (BPS 2006).
We use a village-level dataset from 2005 called PODES
(Potensi Desa/Village Potency; BPS 2006), which consists
of approximately 400 attributes linked to demographics,
socio-economic activities and infrastructure, but we se-
lect only attributes that are relevant to infrastructure.
These data and their units of measurement are pre-
sented in Table 1.
Calculations in preference modelling
Preference models typically include a decision rule based
on a difference of ranking between two objects. For
comparing objects, the common linear scale transform-
ation method is applied to convert the original criterion
scores into standardized scores of utility (Xiang 2001;
Malczewski 2004; Ananda and Herath 2009).
Such a method uses two types of preference criteria.
The first one defines the benefit criteria, which refers to
a stakeholder’s preference for the highest raw score.
(Higher scores are more preferable.) The second defines
cost criteria, which refers to a stakeholder’s preference
Fig. 1 Research Framework
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scores are more preferable.)
Standardization without spatial neighbouring comparison
features
The three common types of standardization procedures
are maximum, interval and goal standardization (Beedasy
and Whyatt 1999; Xiang 2001; Phua and Minowa 2005;
Ananda and Herath 2009). Maximum standardization en-
sures that the standardization values are proportional to
the original values with the 0 values equal to the absolute
0 in the original score. Interval standardization produces a
score that is normalized with a linear function between
the absolute lowest score and the highest score, which im-
plies a relative scale, and aims to exaggerate the differ-
ences. Exaggeration is often required when a slight value
of differences is considered critical. Goal standardization
is similar to interval standardization; however, it assignsspecific reference points within the range of unit i scores
as an ideal or goal value and a minimum or maximum
value acceptable by decision makers.
While we focus on the pro-poor objective, we want to
exaggerate the differences between the poorest and the
richest. Hence, we use interval standardization and apply
the cost criteria to prioritize the poorest (equation [1]).




Pi = the priority score for unit i, the unit is a spatial
target for resource location-allocation.
xi = the score of unit i
max x = the highest absolute score in dataset x
min x = the lowest absolute score in dataset x
Fig. 2 The Special Province of Yogyakarta, Indonesia, consisting of 438 urban and rural villages. Note: The urban area is at the centre of the radial
road networks. The dark colours represent villages with higher values or better infrastructure system performance
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comparison features
To include spatial equity measures, Wismadi et al.
(2013) extended the standardization procedures intoglobal, glocal and local spatial standardization. A global
spatial standardization compares inequity with the refer-
ence of one value within the study region. Accordingly,
the glocal spatial standardization measures the inequity
Wismadi et al. Infrastructure Complexity  (2015) 2:8 Page 7 of 16with the average value from the region. Local spatial
standardization then focuses on addressing inequity
among neighbouring units.
Here, we aim to address local inequity. Priority is given
to the unit with the highest neighbouring inequality
score, with absolute zero as a reference. When unit x
has higher performance than its neighbouring units, we
set the level of inequality as zero, meaning that we will
not prioritize the allocation of resources to this unit.
We describe the neighbouring values of x at village i
as the spatial lag variable W_xi. Spatial lag refers to a lag
or value differences of the same variables on its con-
nected neighbouring location. Connectivity is defined by
physical connectivity (e.g., the availability of bridges or
roads between villages), spatial proximity (distance) or
another type defined in the connectivity rule. Hence,
spatial lag is calculated by averaging all values of neigh-
bouring polygons of xi using a neighbourhood connect-
ivity rule for the weights Wij, that represent connectivity
between neighbouring units of j; i.e.,. Wij = 1 if locations
i and j are adjacent or connected and zero otherwiseFig. 3 Procedure for Location-Allocation Mechanism(also Wii = 0 because as a village cannot be adjacent to
itself ).
Because we prefer to allocate to a unit that has higher
gaps than its neighbour, we apply the benefit criteria of






Pi = the priority score for unit i, the unit is a spatial
target for resource location allocation.
Wij = represents the connectivity between i and its
neighbouring units of j
xlagi = denotes the local inequity of W_xi - xi; however,
if W_xi - xi, < 0, xlagi will be defined as 0.
max xlagi = denotes the maximum local inequity of
W_xi - xi.
Procedure for location-allocation
We use the priority-score for unit i, Pi, obtained from
preference modelling, to allocate target growth for each
Fig. 4 Original Pen’s parade (above) and V-curve parade of gaps
(Yp) and surpluses (Yr) (below)
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the preference modelling are weighted with the popula-





Pi = score of priority of village i from the preference
modelling (0 to 1), obtained with equations (1) and (2)
Qi = population of village i (population)
ai = percentage share of the sum of total additional re-
sources in the region allocated to village i (%)
To obtain equitable growth, with the given 10 % growth,
we first sum the total additional absolute values from all
villages, as A, and then, those amounts are redistributed
to each village according to the priority score (ai) from
equation [3]. Generally, some villages (the poorer villages)
obtain more than 10 % of the initial allocation, whereas
for richer villages, a lower percentage is provided.
Finally, the location-allocation for each village i is pro-
vided with:
Ai ¼ ai⋅A ð4Þ
Ai = allocated absolute value of improved level of ser-
vice for village i (the units refer to performance indica-
tors in Table 3)
ai = percentage share of the sum total additional re-
sources in the region allocated to village i (%)
A = sum total additional absolute values of improved
level of service from all villages from the region (the units
refer to performance indicators in Table 3)
Figure 3 summarizes the location-allocation mechan-
ism applied for both NSPM and SPM,
Equity measurement
Spatial equity analysis
We apply a spatial autocorrelation approach to evaluate
spatial equity. This approach simultaneously addresses
both location and attribute information, thus creating a
powerful analytical technique (Tsou et al. 2005). Here,
we use Moran’s I method, which is commonly applied
for evaluating spatial equity (Lorant et al. 2001; Tsou
et al. 2005; Grubesic 2008). Moran’s I is positive when
nearby objects tend to be similar and suggests an equit-
able distribution, where Moran’s I = 1 is the most equit-
able distribution. On the contrary, Moran’s I is
negative when the object values tend to be more dis-
similar than what is normally expected, with Moran’s
I = −1 being the most inequitable distribution. Moran’s
I = 0 when attribute values are arranged randomly and
independently in space.
A direct extension of the Moran scatter plot can be
viewed as a map of the Local Index of Spatial Autocorrelation(LISA; Anselin 1995). The resulting map locates the clus-
ters of similarity (spatial equity) or dissimilarity (spatial
inequity).
Total utility to measure utilitarian equality
With utilitarian theory, the equality objective is to
maximize the total utility. Hence, a higher total utility in-
dicates compliance with the objective. This measurement
is done by estimating the marginal utility or satisfaction to
one additional unit of resource and summing up the total
utility generated by the distributed resource.
Referring to the Arrow-Pratt relative risk aversion for-
mula (Damodaran 2008), we apply the first derivative of
utility to the wealth of the log utility function of U =
ln(W), U’ = 1/W to measure how utility changes as wealth
(W) changes. Hence, the estimate of marginal utility U ' or
μU for an amount of allocated resources Q at village i with
an existing level of available resources (wealth) of X is:
μU1 ¼ Qi=Xi ð5Þ








Maximum severity burden by the poorest (unit in
utils, which is a hypothetical unit measuring
satisfaction), representing the amount of additional
effort for the poorest to reach the poverty line
3 Poor
Inequality
Gini inequality among “the poor”.
4 Rich
Inequality
Gini inequality among “the rich”.
5 Prosperity Maximum prosperity enjoyed by the richest,
representing the amount of benefits for the richest
above the level of poverty line.
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a lower μU at a higher level of X The total utility (TU)
(equation [6]) can then be calculated by summing the
product of μU and the number of households (H) in vil-





Curve dominance analysis for non-utilitarian equality
measure
The non-utilitarian approach evaluates changes in the
level of opportunity and the effect on the poor and the
rich using curve dominance analysis. The analysis em-
ploys a graphical method to compare distributional
curves, as in Son and Kakwani (2008), formed by ordering
the index from the worst off to the best off (Sen 1980).
Curve dominance analysis can visually be interpreted in
combination with its quantitative measure, e.g., the Lorenz
Curve with the Gini Index (UNDP 2008).
To measure the equality of opportunity, a poverty line
is required to indicate the basic capability needed and to
decompose distribution patterns into areas below and
above the poverty line (Yitzhaki 2002).
Pen’s Parade is one graphical method that introduces a
poverty line (Pen 1971). The curve represents a parade of
every person in the economy walking by, as if in a parade,
arranged by order of income, with the lowest incomes
(dwarfs) at the front and the highest (giants) at the backTable 3 Minimum service level of domestic activity as the poverty l
Infrastructure Performance Indicators References
Transport Average travel speed (km/h) 534/KPTS/M/200
Water Discharge (ltr/day) 534/KPTS/M/200
Telecom Data transfer capacity (kbps/pop) USO Program BT
Electricity Electricity supply per household (VA) TDL PLN(UNDP 2008). With a poverty line, we can calculate the
number of poor people (poverty incidence) and the situa-
tions of the poor (gaps) and the rich (surpluses).
To accurately measure the sense of equity, with refer-
ence to the poverty line, the calculation should recognize
the sense of severity of poor people and the enjoyment
of surplus by rich people. Recognition of this asymmet-
ric shape of the poverty gap on the poor side versus the
prosperity surplus on the wealthy side is important in
equity measurement (Berrebi and Silber 1989)
To meet this requirement, we propose a new graphical
method: a derivation of Pen’s Parade into a parade of
gaps and surpluses, as described below.
Let y1, y2, …, yn be the individual incomes of n income-
receiving units arranged such that y1≤ y2≤… ≤yn, in which
case, rank (ry) of the lowest income is 1, and that of the
highest income is n. Then, graphically, we modify Pen’s Par-
ade by applying the translation y = yi-z, where z represents
the poverty line. Next, for the left part of the curve (with the
negative values), we apply the reflection of the curve with
the horizontal axis. As a result, we obtain a modification of
Pen’s parade as a parade of gaps (on the left-hand side) and
surpluses (on the right-hand side) in aV-shaped curve.
To enable curve comparison, the rank (ry) on the hori-
zontal axis is transformed as cumulative share of the
population; hence, it shows the percentages of the popu-
lation below the poverty line (the poor) and above the
poverty line (the rich).
To recognize the asymmetric shape of gaps and sur-
pluses, as suggested by Berrebi and Silber (1989), we
then normalize both parts of the V-curve in two differ-
ent ways. For the left-hand part, i.e., the gaps, we use:
Ypi ¼ z− yið Þ=yi or Ypi ¼ z=yið Þ – 1 ð7Þ
The variable Ypi reflects the effort that “the poor”
should exert to reach the poverty line. This normalized
value of gaps also reflects the level of severity.
The right-hand side of the V-curve, i.e., the surpluses,
are normalized with:
Yri ¼ yi−zð Þ=z or Yri ¼ yi=zð Þ – 1 ð8Þ
Here, Yri reflects the extra opportunities enjoyed by
“the rich”. This normalized surplus indicates theine
Basic Service Domestic Activity Income
Generating Activity
1 10 15 20
1 30 125 220
IP, 2009 14.4 28.8 56
30 450 2200
Table 4 Evaluation matrix
Aspect Analysis Measure Indicators
Growth Redistribution Pro-poor policy Pro poor growth redistribution Higher average of redistributed growth
Spatial Equity Spatial Autocorrelation Cluster of similarity or dissimilarity Higher Moran's I index that indicate cluster
of similarity
Social Equity Utilitarian Maximize total utility equality Higher summation of marginal utility
Non-Utilitarian Effectiveness to Poverty reduction Lower Poverty Incidence
Lower Poverty Severity
Equality of allocation Lower Poor Inequality
Lower Rich Inequality
Effectiveness to Prosperity Higher Maximum Prosperity
Table 5 Average redistributed growth
Growth: 1×10 % Growth: 2×5 %
Sectors SPM NSPM SPM NSPM
ROAD 17.7 % 15.0 % 8.8 % 7.5 %
ELECT 13.1 % 11.3 % 6.6 % 5.6 %
TELEC 52.2 % 40.1 % 26.3 % 20.1 %
WATER 17.3 % 14.8 % 8.7 % 7.4 %
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are illustrated in Fig. 4.
In this paper, we limit the evaluation of the effect on
pro-poor policy, inequity and prosperity. Hence, the se-
lected indicators are poverty incidence, poverty severity,
inequality among the poor, inequality among the rich,
and prosperity (see Table 2).
To set the poverty line, we use the standard of the
minimum service level in the Ministry Decree for Settle-
ment and Regional Infrastructure No 534/KPTS/M/
2001, USO Program 2009 and the Pricing Category of
Electricity from SOE (PLN; Table 3). Toward the cap-
ability of income-generating activity, we set the poverty
line at the service level for domestic activities. We also
assume that people living in the same village have equal
levels of opportunities.
Results
This section reports the comparison of SPM and NSPM
to allocate the “10 % growth target” in two what-if sce-
narios; (1×10 %) and (2×5 %) simulations. It reviews the
pro-poorness of the growth redistribution, reports the
spatial equity evaluation and finally reflects on the com-
pliance of preference modelling to moral philosophy in
utilitarian and non-utilitarian welfare theories. The re-
sults are outlined using the evaluation matrix in Table 4.
In terms of the pro-poorness of the allocation, the
comparison of the level of redistributed growth reveals
that with 10 % growth, the SPM indicates a higher level
of redistributed growth for all types of infrastructure
than with NSPM, as shown in Table 5. The results of
both (1×10 %) and (2×5 %) based simulations also con-
sistently provide similar finding.
A redistribution of growth, which is much higher than
10 %, indicates that the preference model successfully
distributes most of the growth to poorer groups. In
Table 5, the telecommunications and water infrastruc-
tures require a redistributed growth much higher than
10 %, which indicates a high level of social inequity, and
the poorer groups demand more than the regional targetgrowth. The higher value in SPM also indicates that ad-
dressing social inequity in a location with a neighbour-
hood disparity could increase the average of redistributed
growth. This result indicates that more attention should
be given to spatial inequity.
Effect on spatial equity
To compare the initial level of spatial equity and the
changes due to SPM and NSPM, Fig. 5 shows LISA
maps and its Moran’s I values. It indicates the loca-
tions of spatial inequity (e.g., low-high, the poor
surrounded by the rich, or high-low, the rich sur-
rounded by the poor) and the locations of spatial
equity among the rich (high-high) or among the poor
(low-low).
In general, SPM results in higher Moran’s I values
(closer to 1) than NSPM. The 2×5 % scenario also
indicate that SPM systematicaly improve the spatial
equity. The improved equity with SPM is logical; it
aims to focus more on addressing spatial inequity.
On this ground, it can be said that SPM better
locates a poor connection or missing link of inter-
village infrastructures.
Effect on social equity
Utilitarian
Under utilitarian equity, with a 10 % growth redistribu-
tion, the SPM also results in a higher sum total of mar-
ginal utility to all types of infrastructure, as shown in
Fig. 5 Spatial equity at the initial level and after allocation with SPM and NSPM. Note: LISA, blue (or black in a b/w colour) represents low-low,
red (or dark grey in a b/w colour) represents high-high, and Moran’s I discloses that in general, spatial PM is more effective to address
spatial equity
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under 2×5 %, which indicates group of villages that se-
verely lacking of water clustered in similar location as
shown in LISA map. Such situation makes SPM that
seeks for neighborhood inequity is less senstitive than
NSPM. Moreover, a lower result on 2×5 % simulation in-
dicates that people satisfaction is higher to a distribution
which provided in one delivery than two.
With 10 % growth, the SPM generates a higher total
utility. Hence, in general, the SPM performs better than
the NSPM. This effect corresponds with the result on
growth averages. In a utilitarian, context the total utilityTable 6 Utilitarian total equality
Growth : 1×10 % Growth: 2×5 %
Sectors SPM NSPM SPM NSPM
ROAD 222,764 201,067 184,256 183,320
ELECT 108,390 104,879 100,323 100,042
TELEC 450,157 399,967 359,916 338,996
WATER 153,582 138,290 131,164 132,113indicates that SPM is the preferred choice of target
beneficiaries.Non-utilitarian
Graphical result of curve dominance analysis
The curve comparison (Fig. 5) shows continuous and dis-
continuous lines, which, respectively, indicate distinctive
patterns of SPM and NSPM. For clarity, the initial situ-
ation (before allocation) is not presented in the graph. The
results of 1×10 % and 2×5 % show similar patterns. Using
the curves, an intuitive interpretation of poverty incidence,
its severity and inequality problems can be obtained.
Among the four types of infrastructures, two of them
produce similar patterns (i.e., telecommunications and
water in Fig. 6). Both consistently depict that at the be-
ginning of curve, at the left-most side of gaps, NSPM
perform better than SPM. Meanwhile, at the right-most
side, SPM performs better.
This similar pattern, except for the left side, can also
be found for electricity infrastructure. However, a distinct
Fig. 6 Curve dominance analysis, which discloses the similarity of patterns in the telecommunications and water infrastructures
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Table 8 Maximum severity
Initial Growth: 1×10 % Growth: 2×5 %
Sectors SPM NSPM SPM NSPM
ROAD 1.24 0.25 0.18 0.14 0.16
ELECT 2.5 0.08 0.68 0 0.62
TELEC 95 71 21.64 71 21.4
WATER 17.38 12.2 10.2 12.0 10.11
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source of this behaviour is the way infrastructure services
are delivered, as explained in the discussion section below.
Quantitative result of curve dominance analysis
In addition to pattern observations, a quantitative ana-
lysis is provided. Tables 7, 8, 9 and 10 present the vari-
ation of SPM and NSPM to the level of poverty
incidence, severity and inequality among the poor and
the rich and its level of prosperity.
In addressing poverty, SPM and NSPM do not always
result in similar distributional patterns. For example,
SPM is more effective in reducing the poverty incidence
in the road and electricity infrastructures but not in the
telecommunications and water supply infrastructures,
the sectors where a dominant of low-low cluster of se-
vere poverty found.
A similar variation is also found in the effect of redu-
cing maximum severity. Except for electricity infrastruc-
ture, NSPM is more effective in reducing the severity of
the poorest, and it works best for the poorest in tele-
communications (Table 8). Based on its distribution
mechanism, the results in Tables 7 and 8 indicate that
the poorest are located in approximately the same loca-
tion and form a cluster of similarity and the local in-
equality is not recognized.
In terms of addressing equitable allocation, SPM also
perform better, there is minor variation where NSPM
slightly perform better than SPM to the poor groups
(see Table 9). Meanwhile, for the rich groups, the SPM
consistently performs better than the NSPM for all infra-
structure sectors. An unexpected result, however, is
found where both SPM and NSPM produce a higher
level of inequality in rich groups than the initial condi-
tion (Table 9). The source of such anomaly is explained
in the discussion section.
When looking at the effect on the richest groups
(Table 10), although SPM performs better, less variation
is found. However, for the roads and telecommunica-
tions infrastructures for both SPM and NSPM, there is
no effect on the richest. The fact that SPM affects the
richest in the electricity and water infrastructures indi-
cates that not only is the allocation is pro-poor but it
also pays attention to the group that could be promoting
growth.Table 7 Poverty incidence
Initial Growth: 1×10 % Growth: 2×5 %
Sectors SPM NSPM SPM NSPM
ROAD 9.25 1.25 1.37 1.13 1.37
ELECT 4.13 0.19 0.7 0 0.65
TELEC 82.09 79.59 79.51 79.48 79.51
WATER 91.83 81.69 70.77 80.54 69.88Another interesting result is the similarity of patterns
among the electricity, telecommunication and water infra-
structures, which does not exist for road transportation
(see Table 10). For these infrastructures, the curves cross
each other at Points A and B (Fig. 6), with the exception
of electricity, which crosses only at B. These patterns and
their source of variation require careful observation, as is
done in the discussion section.Discussion
With reference to the indicators listed in the evaluation
matrix (Table 4), the results confirm that in general,
spatial preference modelling (SPM) for resource alloca-
tion is more in accordance with the theories of welfare
than non-spatial preference modelling (NSPM). Some
evidence is discussed here.
With regard to utilitarian theory, we found that SPM
performs better than NSPM for both the redistribution
of growth (Table 5) and total utilitarian equality (Table 6).
This conclusion applies for all types of infrastructure.
The SPM also performs consistently better to serve
non-utilitarian perspectives, particularly for infrastructure
characterized with a linear type of network (see system
characteristics in Table 1). For example, in reducing pov-
erty incidence (Table 7), SPM works better for the road
and electricity infrastructures. These infrastructures that
are formed by networks of a linear typology tend to be
more sensitive to SPM than infrastructure networks of
plane or space typologies. These space typologies occur
when the network creates similar level of service between
locations in close proximity (e.g., wireless telecommunica-
tion and groundwater) and have no issue with local spatial
inequity.
Further evidence that SPM works better for linear
types of networks is the result of the equality of electri-
city and telecommunications of the poor groups (Table 9,
poor section). Here SPM reduced the poor inequality in
a place where incomplete network of linear infrastruc-
ture found in the cluster of poverty.
Moreover, in another inequity assessment, particularly for
rich groups (Table 9, rich section), SPM also works consist-
ently better than NSPM in all types of infrastructure.
Table 9 Poor and rich inequality
Poor Inequality: Initial Growth: 1×10 % Growth: 2×5 % Rich Inequality: Initial Growth: 1×10 % Growth: 2×5 %
SPM NSPM SPM NSPM SPM NSPM SPM NSPM
ROAD 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.07 ROAD 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08
ELECT 0.08 0.00 0.05 0 0.04 ELECT 0.06 0.05 0.05 0 0.04
TELEC 0.11 0.1 0.08 0.1 0.08 TELEC 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14
WATER 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 WATER 0.18 0.21 0.3 0.21 0.3
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spatial equity assessment, which reveals that generally,
SPM performs better than NSPM, as indicated by Moran’s
I in Fig. 5. SPM addresses spatial inequity by increasing
Moran’s I indexes. Even, with two-steps iteration (2x5 %),
SPM is much more effective in addressing spatial inequity.
One observable fact where the NSPM performs better
that SPM is on Poverty Incidence of Water (Table 7).
This is another evidence that in the case of water, the
poorest group are located in same area, where no water
network is available and the water lacking cover a wide
area of the region (see the Low-Low cluster of Water in
Fig. 5). In such cases, as no local spatial inequality is
detected, SPM with a global or goal standardization
(Wismadi et al. 2013) might be applied.
This observation also disloses that the typology of in-
frastructures also determines the effectiveness of certain
types of preference modelling. Infrastructures that com-
bine various typologies also require more attention to
the implementation of spatial preference modelling. In
addition, in an underdeveloping region, the incomplete
network of the linear infrastructure tends to generate
more spatial inequity. In this case, SPM helps find areas
with lower connectivity or an incomplete network struc-
ture (e.g., missing links on a road network, underserved
urban areas from piped water or fibre optic networks).
The curve dominance analysis in Fig. 6 also enriches this
observation. The left-hand side of point A (Fig. 6, tele-
communications and water) indicates the worst-off
groups that live in low-low clusters, whereas on the
right-hand side of point B, areas where spatial inequity
exists are indicated.
In terms of network development, the right-hand side
of B also indicates that incomplete linear networks
(e.g., fibre optic or copper networks, electricity grids or
water pipe networks) exist and create gaps betweenTable 10 Maximum prosperity
Sectors Initial Growth: 1×10 % Growth: 2×5 %
SPM NSPM SPM NSPM
ROAD 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4
ELECT 1 1.56 1.13 1.29 1.01
TELEC 4.25 4.26 4.26 4.26 4.26
WATER 1.53 1.79 1.53 1.79 1.53spaces. Meanwhile, on the left-hand side of A, the lin-
ear networks that have not reached the location result
in low-low clusters (e.g., poor wireless network in rural
areas, or wells in area with groundwater scarcity). The
space between A and B indicates that a combination of
systems are in place (i.e., linear network of copper and
wireless, or water pipes and wells in each household)
and produce an average level of service.
This A/B pattern is not found for transportation. This
irregularity discloses that the road network does not ne-
cessarily determine a linear type of network because the
predominated private vehicles cover a few public trans-
port routes and turn the linear type into plane. More-
over, a complete road network in urban areas does not
guarantee high performance due to traffic congestion.
In addition to the above general conclusion, there are
some interesting findings. First, an anomaly is found re-
garding road infrastructure in the inequality of the poor
group (Table 9, road), where NSPM works better than
SPM. This peculiarity, however, is explainable by the fact
that the linear infrastructure of roads does not deter-
mine the linearity of the service. The absence of public
transport services (which is supposed to be linear in na-
ture) causes the poor groups to have to rely on limited
personal mobility and forms a network similar to space
typology. A similar observation is found in rural areas,
where the poor are mostly located: The issue in electri-
city and telecommunication could be access to networks,
whereas for road and water, the issue is the availability
of service. This nature of the problem might determine
the type of networks in a specific location.
Therefore, in the case that the poorest are located in the
same area and no specific neighbourhood inequality is
recognized, the NSPM would work better in addressing
the worst-off (the poorest), e.g., roads, telecommunica-
tions and water, in Table 8. The fact that telecommunica-
tion and water infrastructures (Table 7) appear more
sensitive to NSPM indicates that similar levels of poverty
are clustered. Figure 6 confirms this finding, where low-
low clusters of telecommunications and water infrastruc-
tures are more dominant than the other infrastructures.
Another interesting observation can be found in in
Table 9 regarding the rich, where it is shown that for
telecommunications and water, the rich inequality level
is initially lower than after allocation. This unexpected
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become non-poor due to the allocation. These new
near-poor groups, approximately 3 % resp. 20 % in tele-
communications and water (see Table 7), contribute to
inequality among the rich.
In the case of the rich groups (Table 10), both types of
preference modelling do not affect this group for road
and telecommunication, but the SPM in particular in-
creases the level of service performance of the richest in
electricity and water infrastructures. These findings indi-
cate that in the case of electricity and water with 10 %
growth, SPM allows for the rich group to benefit from
the growth.
Furthermore, the zero value of poor inequality for
electricity (Table 9) reveals that with 10 % growth,
SPM could reduce more poverty incidences, whereas
NSPM leaves more people and villages in poor condi-
tion. It also implies that in the case of linear infra-
structure has provided sufficient level of service and
only left small group of people and villages under
poverty line (e.g., electricity), SPM could effectively
alleviate deprived villages and poor people to become
non-poor, for example, by connecting the villages to
its better off neighboorhood.
In conclusion, this discussion outlines a list of evi-
dence that SPM performs better than NSPM not only in
satisfying various perspectives of welfare but also in pro-
viding new tools to observe infrastructure operational is-
sues on the ground.Conclusion
We disclose that spatial preference modelling is in com-
pliance with the moral philosophy of both utilitarian and
non-utilitarian theories. In general, SPM performs better
than NSPM to achieve inequitable growth; however, the
combination of both might be necessary with consider-
ation of the level of infrastructure development, the typ-
ology of the infrastructure and the initial level of social
and spatial equity.
Moreover, this research provides a good basis for gen-
eralizing the application of preference modelling for
equity-based resource allocation for infrastructure and
contributes to the debate of “people-centred” versus
“place-base” development (Deichmann et al. 2011).Competing interests
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